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What if  story was homecoming? 
—Aurora Levins Morales, Kindling
Disability is not simply a physical affair for us; 
it is our ontology, a condition of  our being in the world. 
—Robert F. Murphy, The Body Silent
SOMATIC OPENING ONE
My body speaks to me. My body remembers the stories I cannot access. This is what S. Kay 
Toombs calls the “living of  experience,” what Gabriele M. Schwab names “the memories 
of  the body and its somatic enactment” (1992, xi-xvi; 2010, 2). Somatic enactment, 
“somatic existence”: a culmination of  unnamable things. I am always narrative, here; I am 
always porous (Schwab 2010, 2). In these moments, my body repeats and somatic story-tells 
through sensation: nausea in my chest that tug-crawls upward toward my throat, the feeling 
of  being far, far away.
Bodymind. I write these words as a phrase to remember. My body is not the only medium 
through which I access and engage with the world. My mad bodymind directs much of  my 
journeying, impacting how I relate to my body, my presence, how I process and feel.1 For 
over eighteen years, the experiences I have had with madness have dictated how I, to use 
1 Informed by Mad Studies and mad activism, “mad” is a term that some folks with psychiatric disabilities 
use to name themselves, as opposed to using language like “mental illness” or “mental disorder.” Mad as 
an identity term also has political roots.
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Toombs’s language, “exist or live my body” (1995, 11). As a mad border body, a dual traveler, 
someone who exists in the borderlands of  madness/sanity, I engage with the world in a fluid 
way (Kafai 2012). Deterioration and wreckage shape-shift into rootedness and balance, 
back to the chaotic, back to the placid. These somatic enactments can occur in the same 
hour or in the same day. Sometimes, still, my mad bodymind is consistent and tranquil; my 
bodymind is abundance, is respite. Mad phenomenology offers me a language to name my 
bodymind’s experiences as mad, as in search of  orientation. This is mad narrative. This 
is mad phenomenology, an incongruent way of  “being-in-the-world” (Toombs 1995, 3). 
These are the diverse renderings of  “being-disabled-in-the-world” (Diedrich 2010, 210).2 
 
SOMATIC OPENING TWO
There are large parts of  my childhood that I cannot remember. Looking back now, I can 
identify years with colors and sensations; there is no language, no specificity. I am six, or 
maybe ten—gaps exist even here in the retelling—and something has happened to my 
body. I feel the colors green and yellow. I sit in the sun now to remember, to ground myself  
in the tangible. I walk barefoot in the yard by the vegetables that are trying to grow in this 
heat. I am barefoot to feel. I stand on pebbles and still this history is inaccessible. 
Mad phenomenology is not singular. It is expansive, networks that are unique in their 
expressions. Mad phenomenology orients us, the mad many, as we move through our lives; 
it orients our experiences, the remembering, and the forgetting. This phenomenological 
framework reminds me that my body informs my mind, that my mind informs my body, 
and that my experience of  madness and how I am in the world is an integration of  the two. 
Mad phenomenology empowers me with fluctuations and diverse pathways, places where 
my bodymind is not regulated by the madness/sanity binary. 
Mad phenomenology reminds us of  the toxic and fictional renderings of  “normalcy”; it 
helps us push back against the standardization of  nondisabled supremacy, of  neurotypicality. 
I stretch-pull this lens to understand how the narrative of  madness—how naming it and 
acknowledging it gives us the opportunity to move away from stigma. Beyond the medical 
industrial complex and its language of  diagnosis, mad phenomenology creates past the 
singular, rigid mad narrative: madness as an error or defect to fix, madness as an interruption 
to living, madness as a highly gendered and racialized experience.3
 
 
2 Diedrich stresses that she is not using disability here as a “universalizing sign,” but instead as a 
heterogenous identity category with unique, diverse experiences (2001, 210). I use the term here with 
the same logic. 
3 Similar to other disabled folks, I know that my relationship with the medical industrial complex exists 
in a place of duality: I must continue to critique the medical industrial complex while also relying upon 
it to survive.
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In this new space, I am person, I am process, I am bodymind. Mad phenomenology 
ensures I bear witness without judgment to the reality that my mad bodymind needs. This 
mad “vehicle for seeing” pushes me past the shame that often overrides my mad agency. To 
“live my body[mind],” I need more than eight hours of  sleep (Toombs 1995, 10). I need 
slowness. I need to take loving breaks and sit in the sun. I need therapy and medication. 
I need. My lived mad bodymind helps me unsettle the importance of  phrases like “I 
should . . .” and “I cannot . . . .” My mad phenomenology teaches me about a reality 
based in bodymind inquiry; the bodymind becomes a tool (Thomas and Longden 
2015). Here, I look inward. My mad bodymind informs what each day requires: the 
pacing, the levels of  interaction, what I can focus on, what I can do.   
SOMATIC OPENING THREE
My lack of  memory disconnects me from my bodymind. I float-shift through time. I am 
paused; I am distanced. The bathtub is where I go to feel again, to feel through. Gravity 
reminds me of  my tangibility every time I lift myself  from the water. I stand, each time 
astonished: I am a “being-in-the-world” (Toombs 1995, 3). This lifting brings me home to 
the stories remembered and the stories lost. Here, I am made familiar to myself, once again. 
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